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The ciphers y = C (x, k) and y = C(x;k) are isomorphic if there is a computable in
both directions map y $ y, x $ x, k $ k. The cipher is vulnerable to an attack if
the isomorphic cipher is vulnerable to it. If ' is a substitution and T is an encryption
operator, then T = 'T' 1 is a cipher isomorphism. For cryptanalysis it is reasonable to
choose substitution ' in such a way that it has a lot of ﬁxed points. It is shown that
byte substitution ' can have no more than 130 ﬁxed points. Isomorphic AES (IAES) is
proposed where the only non-linear operation is an isomorphic image of the XOR operation.
On average, maximum probabilities of IAES diﬀerentials are 8.5 times higher in comparison
with the original whereas dominance of the linear sum is increased by 3 times. IAES has
diﬀerentials with zero output diﬀerence and probability 1, which slows down replication of
active non-linearities and decreases complexity of an attack. Presumably, resistance of AES
to linear and diﬀerential attacks can be twice reduced by magnitude in comparison with the
generally accepted estimates.
PACS numbers: 89.70.-a
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1. Introduction
The papers [1, 2] suggest using a method
of virtual isomorphisms for cryptanalysis. The
ciphers y = C(x; k) and C = (x;y) are
isomorphic if there is a computable in both
directions map y $ y, x $ x, k $ k. Usually,
cipher C is real, but its isomorphic image C
is virtual and only exists in a cryptanalyst’s
imagination. Isomorphism is not an equivalency
since no transitivity is provided: computable
map composition is not necessarily computable
(analogy: it is easy to compute a key for one
encryption cycle, but it is diﬃcult to do it for
10 ones). In [1, 2] the following assumption has
been proved.
Theorem 1. A cipher is vulnerable to some
attack if and only if the isomorphic cipher is
vulnerable to the same attack.
That is why the search for vulnerability of
the cipher can be substituted with the search for
a suitable isomorphism. If ' is a substitution and
T is a cycle encryption function, then T = 'T' 1
is a cipher isomorphism.
Two substitutions are conjugated if and
only if they have the same cycle type [3]. So
a non-linear substitution deﬁned by inversion
in the ﬁnite ﬁeld, is conjugated with the aﬃne
substitution, deﬁned by one or several bits
inversion.
Isomorphism of ciphers, deﬁned by
conjugation [1] is not practical: in the isomorphic
cipher all operations, carried out in one cycle of
encryption, apart from one become non-linear.
Conjugate substitution ' was chosen in such a
way so that it would have a lot of ﬁxed points.
The most popular methods to compute
unknown parameters are linear [4] and diﬀerential
[5] ones, which require a lot of plaintext and
ciphertext. Apart from this, there are algebraic
methods [6, 7] based on solving some systems
of algebraic equations that describe a map and
require just a few plaintexts and ciphertexts. It is
possible to combine these methods [8].
Let n-bit substitution S change an input
215
216 A. G. Rostovtsev and A. F. Suprun
vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) into an output vector
y = (y1, . . . , yn). If xi, yiare independent binary
variables then linear over the ﬁeld F2 functionPn
i=1 aixi +
Pn
i=1 biyi, ai, bi 2 F2 takes value 0
and 1 with the same frequency. However, if xi,
yi are inputs and outputs of the substitution,
probabilities P(0), P(1) of 0 and 1 can diﬀer
from 0.5. The remainder P(0)   0.5 is called
dominance. Linear analysis is based on search for
such non-constant linear functions with maximum
absolute dominance of linear sums (ADLS). The
operation of addition with a constant does not
change the linear sum. The linear operation of
diﬀusion as a result of distribution law does
not change the value of dominance but does
change the type of the linear sum. Thus, it
is possible to obtain, for the map as a whole,
linear sums of input text, key and output text
bits plus probability that this sum will equal
0. If the number of known texts is rather
big, unknown parameters are computed through
solving a system of linear equations. The resulting
dominance is proportional to the product of
factors. The weakest substitutions are the ones
that have linear sums with dominance 0:5.
Let x;x0 be a pair of binary vectors, y =
S(x), y0 = S(x0). Let us mark x = x + x0,
y = y + y0, at this y = 0 if and only if
x = 0. Diﬀerential analysis is based on the
fact that probabilities of diﬀerentials (x;y)
are distributed non-uniformly. The operation of
addition with the key keeps the diﬀerential and
its probability, the diﬀusion operation changes
the type of the diﬀerential but maintains its
probability. Computation of unknown parameters
reduces to search for most probable diﬀerentials
for a map as a whole. Probability of the resulting
diﬀerential equals the product of probabilities of
factor diﬀerentials. The weakest substitutions are
the ones that have diﬀerentials with probability
1.
To resist linear and diﬀerential analysis,
substitutions are chosen so that both maximum
probability of the substitution diﬀerential and
maximum absolute dominance value for the
substitution can minimized.
The placecountry-region USA encryption
standard called AES [9] uses such a substitution
deﬁned by the inversion in ﬁeld F256. Maximum
probability of the diﬀerential equals 4/256,
maximum dominance of the linear sum is
16/256. This substitution has two ﬁxed points
and 127 cycles of length 2, so it can be
suggested approximately that all cycles of this
substitution have length 2 (accuracy of such
approximation is 2 7). Then the inversion in ﬁeld
F256 is accompanied almost everywhere by the
substitution deﬁned as addition with constant.
Presumably, complexity of a diﬀerential and
linear attack on AES exceeds the complexity of
scanning the keys.
This paper shows that conjugate
substitution ' can have 130 ﬁxed points
and this assessment cannot be improved. An
isomorphism has been proposed with the use of
four auxiliary substitutions wherein isomorphic
AES (IAES) image has only one non-linear
operation – XOR operation image. At that,
probabilities of IAES diﬀerentials are raised
by 8.5 times in comparison with the original
cipher whereas dominance of linear sums has
been tripled. Rough estimation shows that, since
probability of the diﬀerential grows from p to pp,
which the proposed isomorphism accepts, the
AES strength halves by the order of magnitude.
This creates prerequisites for practical attacks
on AES with the use of a virtual isomorphism
technique.
2. Algebraic basis
If S, T are elements of symmetric group
G, then map S : T ! STS 1 is conjugation.
Conjugation is equivalency and divides group G
by classes of conjugate elements. If S runs the
entire symmetric group, we get a class for T.
Let G be a subgroup of the symmetric
group of n-bit substitutions, generated by two or
several substitutions, and x be the substitution
input. The orbit of element x is a set of n-
bit words into which x can be transformed by
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substitutions from G. Ownership of two words by
one orbit is equivalency. So the set of n-bit words
is divided into non-crossing orbits (in relation
to group G). If group G is cyclic and formed
by one substitution, the orbits are cycles of the
substitution.
Each substitution can be deﬁned by sets of
cycles. If l1, . . . , lr are lengths of all substitution
cycles, then
Pr
i=1 li = 2
n. The set of numbers (l1,
. . . , lr), li 6 li+1,
P
li = 2
n, is called a cycle type
of the substitution. Substitutions are conjugate if
and only if they have the same cycle type [3].
Substitution S is called aﬃne one if it is
deﬁned by equation y = Lx + c, where L is
an invertible over F2 matrix (when c = 0 the
substitution is linear). Aﬃne substitutions form a
subgroup of the substitution group. Substitutions
S, T are aﬃnely equivalent if there is a relation
S = ATB, where A, B are aﬃne substitutions.
Aﬃne equivalency is eﬀectively identiﬁed [10].
Let y = T (x) be an arbitrary map of a set
of n-bit words in themselves. This map can be
deﬁned through use of interpolating polynomials
over the ﬁeld of characteristic 2. Such polynomials
create a ﬁnite ring. The Zhegalkin polynomial ring
is usually used:
Gn[x] = F2[x 1, . . . , xn]/(x 12 + x 1, . . . , xn2 + xn).
The Zhegalkin polynomial ring is ﬁnite (as a
result, it is Artin) and has zero Krull dimension
[11]. In it the product of ideals coincides with
their intersection. Each ideal is expanded into
prime factors. The prime ideal is maximal and
consists of polynomials turning into 0 at this set
of variables. There are altogether 2n prime ideals.
A prime ideal is deﬁned by one polynomial,
for example, 1 + x 1. . . xn. That is why each
ideal of the ring Gn[x] can be deﬁned by one
polynomial. The set of vectors x of n bit length
forms the aﬃne space An. At this M2 = M,
the zero ideal corresponds to An, the unit ideal
corresponds to an empty set.
Automorphism of the ring Gn[x] keeps
constants and transforms a prime ideal into
a prime ideal (supposing a prime ideal gets
mapped into the product of diﬀerent prime ideals,
inversion gets upset). Every permutation of prime
ideals is an automorphism of the ring Gn[x] and
inversely, every automorphism is deﬁned by some
substitution. Since there is a bijection between
the set of space points An and set of prime
ideals, the group of automorphisms is isomorphic
towards the group of set permutations from 2n
elements. Any permutation is deﬁned by a set of
polynomials from Gn[x]. Map of the polynomial
ring is called regular if it is deﬁned by a set of
polynomials. If there is also an inverse map, it is
called biregular. So, all automorphisms Gn[x] are
biregular.
Probabilities of diﬀerentials and linear sums
of n-bit substitution can be represented as a
square matrix of size 2n [12]. Rows and columns
of the matrix of diﬀerentials (x,y) correspond
to sets {x, y}. Elements of the matrix
correspond to the number of appearance of this
diﬀerential if the substitution input runs the





j bjyj are deﬁned by the





j bjyj . The elements
of the matrix conform to the number of this linear
sum execution if the substitution input runs the
entire set of 2n values minus 2n 1.
Any substitution is deﬁned by the Zhegalkin
polynomial system, i.e. by sharable zeros of the
polynomial set. The polynomial set deﬁnes ideal
A, the set of the ideal’s zeros is a varietyV (A) and
inversely, any variety as a set of points explicitly
deﬁnes some ideal. Thus, every substitution is
explicitly deﬁned by the ideal and variety.
Any image of ﬁnite Boolean sets is deﬁned
by the ideal and variety. The ideal and variety of
substitution S correspond to two substitutions S,
S 1 at least.
Let us mark  the symbol of ideal addition.
It is obvious that AB  A, V (AB)  V (A)
for ideals A and B.
Let us deﬁne probability of a diﬀerential
x = (xi1 ; :::; xik) of an arbitrary ideal A 
Gn[x]. Let A = (f (x)). Let us mark the formal
partial derivative by xi as D(f, xi), introduce
relation D(f, {xi, xj}) = D(f, xi) + D(f, xj) +
D(D(f, xi), xj);
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and further on by induction:
D(f; fxi1 ; ldots; xilg) =
D(D(f; fxi1 ; : : : ; xil 1g); xil). It is obvious
that D(f; fxi1 ; :::; xikg) is a polynomial and,
consequently, deﬁnes the ideal as well. Probability
of the diﬀerential x = (xi1 ; : : : ; xik) of an ideal
A = (f) equals
#V ((f)) (D (f; fxi1 ; : : : ; xikg)))
#V ((f))
:
This deﬁnition extends the one for the
diﬀerential of a substitution. Thus, it is possible to
calculate any map probability of the s-bit words
set into the set of t-bit words.
Similarly, it is possible to deﬁne non-linearity
of an ideal as the Hamming distance between the
polynomial, predetermining the principal ideal,
and the set of aﬃne functions, at this, diﬀerences
are added only by the variety of the ideal.
3. AES isomorphisms
Let x, y, k be respectively the plaintext,
cipher text and key of cipher C, and let x;y;k
be respectively the plaintext, cipher text and
key of cipher C. Isomorphism of ciphers C,C
is a computable in either direction, invertible
map y $ y, x $ x, k $ k. Thus the
relation y = C(x; k) is met if and only if there
is the relation y = C(x;k). Ciphers C, C
are called isomorphic if there is an isomorphism
between them (C = C ). Cipher C is vulnerable
to some cryptanalysis method if and only if
isomorphic cipher C is vulnerable towards the
same cryptanalysis method.
The technique of virtual isomorphisms can
be illustrated with the example of the USA AES
cryptographic standard [9].
AES standard has 10, 12 or 14 encryption
cycles, the block length is 128 bits, the key length
is 128, 192 or 256 bits. The following operations
are performed in every cycle.
1. A block is divided into bytes and ﬁxed
substitution z = S (x ) of bytes is made
(probabilities of diﬀerentials and ADLS do
not exceed 2 6). The substitution is deﬁned
as a composition of operation U raising
to power 254 in the ﬁnite ﬁeld F256 =
F2[t ]/(t8 + t4 + t3 + t + 1) and an aﬃne
substitution. The result of raising to the
power is represented as 8-bit vector y over
F2, and it is assumed that z = Ly + c,
where every element c is a trace of the row




1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0














Let us mark M (x) = Lx + c. Substitution
M consists of cycles with length 4.
Maximum probability of substitution
diﬀerential S equals 4/256, maximum
dominance of the linear sum is 16/256.
2. A diﬀusion operation, which can be deﬁned
as matrix W with size 16  16 over ﬁeld
F256, aﬀecting a 16 element vector.
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t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t
1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 t
0 0 0 1 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0
0 0 0 1 + t 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 t 0
0 0 0 t 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0 0
0 0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 t 0 0
0 0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 t 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 t 0 0 0 0 1 + t 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 t 1 + t 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
3. An operation of addition with the cycle key
(XOR). This operation can be united with
addition of bytes in a diﬀusion map.
Thus, AES is described in terms of
substitution of a byte, the product by matrix,
addition of bytes.
Each byte can be represented as a binary
vector in the basis [1, t, t2, . . . , t7]. Elements 0,
1, t, 1 + t of matrixW correspond to the matrixes
over ﬁeld F2 with size of 8*8: zero, identity E,
Lt =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
and Lt1 = Lt + E. At this, LtLt1 = Lt1Lt, but
conditions M (Lt(x ) = Lt(M (x )), M (Lt1(x ) =
Lt1(M (x )) are impossible for none of x. Matrix
W can be seen as a block one over F2, containing
blocks of 4 types.
Next, we will see the AES substitution as
an inversion in a ﬁnite ﬁeld and operation M
as a constituent of a diﬀusion map. At this, the
zero block of matrix W remains zero due to the
relation 0M = 0. The identity block of matrix
W transforms into aﬃne substitution M. Block
Lt transforms into the aﬃne substitution Lt(Mx
+ c) = LtMx + Ltc. Block Lt + E transforms
into the aﬃne substitution (E + Lt)(Mx + c) =
(M + LtM )x + (E + Lt)c.
Substitution U, deﬁned as an inversion in the
ﬁnite ﬁeld consists of 127 cycles of length 2 and
two ﬁxed elements {0, 1}. Let T be a substitution
where T (1) = 0, T (0) = 1, T (x ) = U (x ) under
x 6= 0, 1. Then the relation U (x ) = T (x ) is
executed with high probability 1   2 7 = 0.992.
Substitution T consists only of length 2 cycles
and so it is conjugated with the aﬃne substitution
that consists of length 2 cycles:
T= {1, 0, 141, 246, 203, 82, 123, 209, 232, 79, 41,
192, 176, 225, 229, 199, 116, 180, 170, 75, 153, 43,
96, 95, 88, 63, 253, 204, 255, 64, 238, 178, 58, 110,
90, 241, 85, 77, 168, 201, 193, 10, 152, 21, 48, 68,
162, 194, 44, 69, 146, 108, 243, 57, 102, 66, 242,
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53, 32, 111, 119, 187, 89, 25, 29, 254, 55, 103, 45,
49, 245, 105, 167, 100, 171, 19, 84, 37, 233, 9, 237,
92, 5, 202, 76, 36, 135, 191, 24, 62, 34, 240, 81,
236, 97, 23, 22, 94, 175, 211, 73, 166, 54, 67, 244,
71, 145, 223, 51, 147, 33, 59, 121, 183, 151, 133,
16, 181, 186, 60, 182, 112, 208, 6, 161, 250, 129,
130, 131, 126, 127, 128, 150, 115, 190, 86, 155,
158, 149, 217, 247, 2, 185, 164, 222, 106, 50, 109,
216, 138, 132, 114, 42, 20, 159, 136, 249, 220, 137,
154, 251, 124, 46, 195, 143, 184, 101, 72, 38, 200,
18, 74, 206, 231, 210, 98, 12, 224, 31, 239, 17, 117,
120, 113, 165, 142, 118, 61, 189, 188, 134, 87, 11,
40, 47, 163, 218, 212, 228, 15, 169, 39, 83, 4, 27,
252, 172, 230, 122, 7, 174, 99, 197, 219, 226, 234,
148, 139, 196, 213, 157, 248, 144, 107, 177, 13,
214, 235, 198, 14, 207, 173, 8, 78, 215, 227, 93, 80,
30, 179, 91, 35, 56, 52, 104, 70, 3, 140, 221, 156,
125, 160, 205, 26, 65, 28}.
It is convenient to choose the aﬃne
substitution as conjugate image T of substitution
T (for example, M 2 or addition with constant).
Conjugate substitution T has probability
diﬀerentials 1 and linear sums with absolute
dominance 0.5. Substitution T has maximum
probabilities of diﬀerentials 4/256 and dominance
of linear sums 16/256.
Let us deﬁne distance d(S 1, S 2) between two
n-bit substitutions S, T as a number of inputs,
for which S 1(x ) 6= S 2(x ). The aﬃne substitution
has diﬀerentials and linear sums with probability
of 0 or 1. The distance between this substitution
S (x ) and a group of aﬃne substitutions Aﬀ (x)
equals min(d(S, A)), if A runs the entire group
Aﬀ. Typically, the closer the substitution is to the
aﬃne one in terms of the stipulated remainder,
the bigger the probability of diﬀerentials is.
If the stipulated aﬃne substitution is an
identity one, the distance between conjugate
substitution ' and the unit substitution equals
to the number of substitution points ' so that
'(x ) 6= x. That is why to approximate the
conjugate substitution to the aﬃne substitution
it is desirable to provide a bigger number of ﬁxed
points.
Let G be a group forcing on set M. Let us
mark Orb(x, G) the orbit of element x 2 M in
relation to group G. Let us choose substitution '
so that it has maximum number of ﬁxed points.
For this, let us divide the set of bytes into
orbits in relation to group hT; Ti, generated by
substitutions T and T.
Theorem 2. Let S1, S2 be substitutions forcing
on n-bit words and consisting only of length 2
cycles and let hS1, S2i be the group generated by
these substitutions. Then Orb(x, hS1, S2i) has an
even length.
Proof Since S 12 = S 22 = E (identity
substitution) the group consists of substitutions
{E, S 1, S 2, S 1 S 2, S 2S 1, S 1S 2S 1, S 2S 1S 2,
S 1S 2S 1S 2, . . . }. According to the condition, the
orbit length is not less than 2. Let us assume
that some orbit has length 3. Without loss of
generality, one can consider that the orbit of
element x includes S 1(x ). Then S1S2S1(x) = x)
S1S2(x) = S1(x), from which S 2(x ) = x, which is
impossible. Likewise it is proved that the orbit
length cannot equal 5, 7, etc. 
Consequence 1.
Orbits of group hT, T i have an even length.
It is directly tested that out of 255 possible
substitutions T, deﬁned by inversions of several
bits, only the inversion of the least signiﬁcant
bit jointly with substitution T gives two orbits
of length 2, whereas other orbits have length 6.
Other substitutions T give orbits of bigger length,
which limits the choice of conjugate substitution
'.
If the orbit has length 2 then both elements
of the orbit can be ﬁxed points of substitution
'. Indeed, if the orbit consists of elements (a, b),
then T (a) = b, T (b) = a, T(a) = b, T(b) = a.
Since 'T' 1 = T it can be assumed that '(a) =
a, '(b) = b.
Theorem 3. Let n-bit substitutions S1, S2 consist
of cycles of length 2 and the orbit length of
element a in relation to group hS1, S2i is bigger
than 2. The following conclusions are true.
1. The orbit of an element in relation to group
hS1, S2i coincides with the orbit of the same
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element in relation to any group hS1, S1S2i,
hS1, S2S1i, hS2, S1S2i, hS2, S2S1i.
2. The orbit of element a can be written
down in a cyclic type (a, S1(a), S2S1(a),
S1S2S1(a), S2S1S2S1(a), . . . ).
3. The orbit length of element a in relation to
the group hS1, S2i equals the duplicate cycle
length of element a in substitution S2S1.
4. There is such a conjugate substitution '
that S1 = 'S2' 1, which keeps the elements
ﬁxed on either all even or all odd positions
of the orbit according to clause 2.
5. There is no conjugate substitution with the
number of ﬁxed points of the orbit bigger
than half of the orbit.
6. If S1 = 'S2'1 and ' keeps elements ﬁxed
on either even or odd positions of the orbit,
then Orb(x, hS1, S2i) = Orb(x, hS1, S2, 'i)
for all x.
Proof (1) In virtue of equation S 1*S 1S 2 =
S 2 substitutions S 1, S 1S 2 can be considered as
the ones forming groups hS 1, S 2i. From equation
S 2S 1*S 1 = S 2 it follows that hS 1, S 2i = hS 1,
S 2S 1i. Similarly it is proved that hS 1, S 2i = hS 2,
S 1S 2i = hS 2, S 2S 1i.
(2) and (3) Let the cycle length of element a
for substitution S 2S 1 equal k. Then k > 1 since
from conditions S 2S 1(a) = a and S 12(a) = a it
follows that S 1(a) = S 2(a), and the orbit consists
of two elements, which goes against the condition.
If we multiply equation (S 2S 1)k(a) = a by S 2
on the left, we obtain (S 1S 2)k 1S 1(a) = S 2(a).
So, the mentioned cycle contains S 2(a). Similarly,
(S 1S 2)k 1(a) = S 2S 1(a), (S 1S 2)k 2S 1(a) =
S 2S 1S 2(a). So, the cycle mentioned in clause 2
contains a, S 1(a), S 2(a), S 1S 2(a), S 2S 1(a), . . . ,
i.e. the entire orbit of element a. Elements of
this cycle on odd positions correspond to the
substitution cycle S 2S 1. Since the orbit length is
even, it equals the duplicate cycle length of the
substitution S 2S 1.
(4) To calculate substitution ' let '(a) = a.
Then from the equation S 1(a) = 'S 2' 1(a) =
'(S 2(a)) we ﬁnd '(S 2(a)). Then, let '(S 2S 1(a))
= S 2S 1(a) (this is a ﬁxed point) and ﬁnd
'(S 2S 1S 2(a)), etc. We obtain ﬁxed elements of
substitution ' on all odd positions of the cycle
according to clause 2. Similarly, it is possible to
make the elements ﬁxed on all even positions of
the cycle.
(5) Supposing we have managed to make all
the elements on odd positions and one element on
an even position ﬁxed. Without loss of generality
it can be assumed that it is element S 1(a).
Then conditions of ﬁxity of points a, S 1(a) in
substitution ' result in equation S 2S 1(a) = a,
which contradicts the condition of the theorem
(orbit length of element a is bigger than 2).
(6) The proof results from the fact that if y
2 Orb(x, hS 1, S 2i) and '(y) = y, then '(S 2(y))
= S 1(y), and also S 1(y) 2 Orb(x, hS 1, S 2i), S 2(y)
2 Orb(x, hS 1, S 2i), i. e. the input and output of
substitution ' lie in Orb(x, hS 1, S 2i). 
The experiment demonstrates that if
substitution T is an inversion of the least
signiﬁcant bit, the two orbits of bytes in relation
to group hT, T i have length 2: {{0, 1}, {188,
189}}, and other 42 orbits have length 6: {2, 3,
246, 247, 140, 141}, {4, 5, 82, 83, 202, 203}, {6,
7, 209, 208, 122, 123}, . . . , {214, 215, 234, 235,
227, 226}. If it is not the least signiﬁcant bit, but
other sets of bits that get inverted, the number of
orbits diminishes considerably whereas the orbit
length grows.
Theorem 3 results in the following
assumption.
Consequence 2.
1. For substitution T and inversion of the
least signiﬁcant bit T there are 242 conjugate
substitutions ', complying with equation T =
'T' 1 and having 130 ﬁxed points.
2. There are no other substitutions T deﬁned as an
inversion of one or several bits for which conjugate
substitution ', complying with equation T =
'T' 1, would have 130 or more ﬁxed points.
Theorem 4. There is no aﬃne substitution T
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where T2 = E and T has only two ﬁxed points.
Proof Let us examine such substitution T(x)
= Lx + c. Let Lx1 + c = x1, Lx2 + c = x2
be ﬁxed points. Then L(x1 + x2) = x1 + x2
is the only non-zero solution, so it is possible to
consider that T = L. Let La = a be the only
non-zero solution. Then L(a + x) = La + Lx
= a + Lx. Without loss of generality it can be
assumed that a = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Then the ﬁrst
row and ﬁrst column of matrix L equal a. Let us
mark 7*7 the block of matrix L, which consists of
other elements, like L7. Then the equation L7b =
b is impossible for non-zero b (otherwise L will
have 4 ﬁxed elements). Consequently, the matrix
L7 + E is invertible and L72 = E. But then the
matrix (L7 + E )2 has to be invertible, too. We
have contradiction (L7 + E )2 = L72 + E = 0. 
Consequence 3. There is no aﬃne
substitution, conjugate with the inversion in F256.
4. Isomorphic AES for four
auxiliary byte substitutions
Conjugate AES has a linear operation of
substitution, non-linear operations of diﬀusion
(substitution images M, Lt, Lt1) and a non-linear
operation of byte addition.
Let us notice that if T = 'T' 1 and T
is the inversion of the least signiﬁcant bit, then
the isomorphic image of byte addition operation
cannot be linear, since the equation '( (x ) +
 (y)) = x + y is only possible with aﬃne
substitution  and linear substitution '. So, let
us try to make maps of diﬀusion substitutions M,
Lt, Lt1 aﬃne. Supposing Mt = LtM, Mt1 = Lt1M
are aﬃne substitutions.
Let us choose auxiliary substitutions ',  ,
1, 2 so that isomorphic images of bytes in
the diﬀusion map will be only zero or identity
ones (E ). We get these conditions for identity
substitutions:
1. T = ' 1T',
2. M = E =   1M',
3. Mt = E =  11 Mt',
4. Mt1 = E = 2 1 Mt1'.
Such auxiliary substitutions  , 1, 2 exist
and are uniquely deﬁned.
Let us mark the AES cipher image
considering the aforementioned regular
automorphisms of the Zhegalkin ring of
polynomials as IAES.
Theorem 5. If M, Mt, Mt1 are arbitrary
substitutions and M =   1M', Mt = 1 1Mt',
Mt1 = 2 1Mt1', then ',  , 1, 2 are aﬃnely
equivalent.
Proof The proof results from the aﬃne
equivalency deﬁnition and the fact that M, Mt,
Mt1 are aﬃne substitutions. 
Aﬃne equivalency permutes probabilities of
diﬀerentials, i.e. values of probabilities remain,
but the type of diﬀerentials changes.
Theorem 6. Maps T = ' 1T', M=   1M',
Mt = 1 1Mt', Mt1 = 2 1 Mt1' deﬁne the
isomorphism of ciphers AES ! IAES.
Proof Let us see the ﬁrst byte of a text after
one encryption cycle in AES and IAES. Let
us mark x1; : : : ; x16 the bytes of the input
text. Transformation of the byte in AES has the
following form:
x1  (k1 +MtT (x1) +Mt1T (x6) +MT (x11)
+ MT (x16)):
In IAES the initial map (x)i  ' 1(xi),
ki  ' 1(ki) is done. Transformation of the
same byte in IAES has this form x1  
 1((k1) + 1(Mt(T(x1))) + 2(Mt1(T(x6))) +
 (M(T(x11))) +  (M(T(x16)))). Then the ﬁrst
summand is '(k1) = '' 1(k1) = k1. The second
summand of the bracketed expression for IAES
equals 1(Mt(T(x1))) = 1 11 Mt
 1T(x1) =
MtT (x1) that coincides with the second summand
for AES. Similarly, the third, fourth, and
ﬁfth summands for IAES coincide with the
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corresponding summands for AES. The same is
true for other sums of bytes. 
So, in IAES the substitution image is an
inversion of the least signiﬁcant bit (with error
rate 2 7), map images M, Mt, Mt1 are aﬃne and
have probability diﬀerentials 1 and linear sums
with absolute dominance 0.5. Thus, in IAES there
is only one non-linear operation – isomorphic
image of XOR (IXOR) operation, mapping 5
bytes into one byte. This operation is obviously
not a substitution, but is deﬁned by an ideal
from 48 variables (40 bits of input variables and
8 bits of output variables) and, consequently, has
diﬀerentials with corresponding probabilities.
Let us examine diﬀerential and linear
properties of IAES.
5. Results of the experiment and
security of AES
Substitutions M, Mt, Mt1, ',  , 1, 2 and
tables of maximum dominances and linear sums
are given in the appendix A.
Herein the image of XOR 5 bytes is
examined as substitutions of types ' 1( (x ) +
y), ' 1(1(x ) + y), ' 1(2(x ) + y) for all sorts of
y. Thus, the sum of all summands, apart from one,
is considered ﬁxed. Each y deﬁnes its substitution
as input function x.
In IAES cipher probabilities of diﬀerentials
and dominances of linear sums of the IXOR map
are deﬁned by a boundless table. That is why the
appendix includes maximum values of diﬀerential
values for each of 256 y and both maximum and
minimum values of dominances.
Original AES has maximum probabilities
of diﬀerentials 4/256. IAES cipher per one
byte of IXOR has maximum probabilities of
diﬀerentials 256/256, 96/256/, 92/256. The
average value of maximum probabilities by all
y = 0, . . . , 255 equals 34.7/256 = 0.136.
It is noticeable that maximum probabilities of
diﬀerentials are on average 8.7 times higher. IAES
пїЅipher has absolute maximum dominances
of linear sums 128/256, 72/256 for all the
mentioned substitutions. It is clear that maximum
dominances of linear sums are on average 3 times
higher by all y in comparison with the original
AES.
Let us assess the probability of diﬀerential
characteristic of 10-cycle IAES accordingly [12].
In diﬀerential cryptanalysis, probabilities of
diﬀerentials of non-linear dominances belonging
to diﬀerential / linear characteristics are
multiplied together. In each cycle, beginning
from the third one, all 16 non-linear blocks
participate in transformation. If in the original
AES the diﬀerential probability is 2 6167 =
2 672, then in IAES (supposing probabilities
are 8 times higher from 2 6 to 2 3 on average,
i.e. probability p is substituted with pp) the
diﬀerential probability will be 2 3167 = 2 336.
We obtain that security of IAES (and, as a
result, security of AES) is 2 times lower by
the order of magnitude comparing to previous
assessments. If there are 16 active non-linearities
in the diﬀerential characteristic of one IAES
round, complexity of a diﬀerential attack per
one round decreases by 2316 = 248 times in
comparison with AES. Let us remark that
when carrying out cryptanalysis of diﬀerential
probabilities, dominances of linear sums can be
signiﬁcantly increased due to parallel branches
in the characteristic. In the linear cryptanalysis,
dominances for separate non-linear maps included
in the linear sum get multiplied together. At this,
complexity of an attack is inversely proportional
to the squared dominance.
The introduced estimation is very rough.
Real diﬀerential IAES cryptanalysis requires
clarifying in comparison with [12], since
probabilities of diﬀerentials depend on the
key.
The following theorem shows that there
is a mechanism that allows, on the one hand,
obtaining diﬀerentials of probability 1 for IXOR
and, on the other hand, inhibits propagation
of active non-linearities in the diﬀerential IAES
characteristic.
Theorem 7. Let a, b, c, d be four bytes
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predetermining the following sum:
' 1( (a) +  (b) + 1(c) + 2(d)):
Then a pair of four bytes (a, a, c, d), (a + , a
+ , c, d) gives a zero diﬀerence at the output
for any .
Proof Let us remark that equations ' 1(x ) =
' 1(y) and x = y are carried out simultaneously.
That is why operation ' 1can be omitted from
the condition of the theorem. Let us examine two
fours of bytes (a, b, c, d) and (a1, b1, c1, d1),
which deﬁne sums z =  (a) +  (b) + 1(c)
+ 2(d) and z 1 =  (a1) +  (b1) + 1(c1) +
2(d1). Then the equations a = b, a1 = b1,
c1 = c, d1 = d deﬁne the relation z = z 1. It
means that a pair of four bytes (a, a, c, d) and
(a + , a + , c, d) determines the input
diﬀerence of IXOR operation, where the output
diﬀerence equals 0 at any a, c, d, . Thus, a
collection of these diﬀerentials has probability 1.
The fact that the output probability equals 0,
inhibits distribution of active non-linearities in
the diﬀerential characteristic of IAES cipher. 
Theorem 7 deﬁnes the mechanism which
allows diminishing the number of active non-
linearities in the diﬀerential characteristic. Let us
remark that the diﬀusion map in AES, IAES is
a substitution, acting on 16-byte words. Since no
substitution can have a zero output diﬀerence at
a non-zero input diﬀerence, then for each IAES
round and a non-zero input diﬀerence, the output
diﬀerence per all the block will also be non-zero.
As in IAES the dominance increases
considerably (more than three times) and
dominances for non-linearities, belonging to
the linear sum, get multiplied together, the
dominance of the linear sum of output in IAES
per one round at 16 active non-linearities is 6107
times more than an analogous dominance in AES.
At this, the complexity of a linear attack per one
round is 3.61015 times lower in comparison with
AES (without considering parallel branches).
The analogue of theorem 7 is, obviously, true
for the linear cryptanalysis as well. So, the virtual
isomorphism method gives two mechanisms
to decrease security: increased probabilities
of diﬀerentials (linear sums) and decreased
number of active non-linearities (their number is
proportional to security logarithm). This paper
examines only the ﬁrst mechanism.
This makes us doubt that security of IAES
(and, respectively, that of AES) to the diﬀerential
or linear analysis equals complexity of search for
the keys.
In the research, aﬃne substitution T was
used, which is only approximately conjugated
with the inversion in ﬁeld F256 (error rate is
2 7). This error can be eliminated if substitution
T is changed for a quasi-aﬃne one, where the
least signiﬁcant bit is deﬁned by the polynomial
y8 + x8 + (1 + x1) : : : (1 + x7). Non-linear
diﬀerential probabilities of substitution T, in
this case, equal 1 or 252/256, but maximum
dominances of linear sums remain 128/256. At
this, the type of substitutions ',  , 1, 2 does
not change.
6. Conclusions
1. The virtual isomorphism method is a
prospective tool of cryptanalysis. It allows
us to change an approach to analysis of
ciphers. A cryptanalyst, when examining
a cipher, used to search for a new
cryptanalysis method for which the cipher
was vulnerable (while ciphers are designed
to withstand the known attacks). Today
a cryptanalyst that has the knowledge
of some universal cryptanalysis method
and examines a cipher, can just choose
a suitable isomorphism the isomorphic
cipher will be vulnerable to for the chosen
cryptanalysis method.
2. Apparently, the strength of AES to
diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis is
considerably lower than it is commonly
believed.
3. These ﬁndings can be extended on AES-
like ciphers, where the diﬀusion map
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forces on the same length words as a
substitution. For these ciphers there is a
class of supposedly weak substitutions. A
substitution is supposedly weak if it is
aﬃnely equivalent to the substitution of
the same or almost the same cycle type
as a speciﬁc aﬃne substitution. Evidently,
this class of substitutions is very vast. It is
not known if there are substitutions which
are not supposedly weak. An algorithm to
recognize supposedly weak substitutions is
not known.
4. Strength of an AES-like cipher with a
supposedly weak substitution is determined
by the virtual isomorphism in use, rather
than by properties of the substitution itself.
That is why it can be expected that the
choice of special substitutions does not
allow increasing the strength of the cipher
considerably in comparison with arbitrary
substitutions (it may be assumed that it is
impossible to recognize a supposedly weak
substitution).
Appendix A: Auxiliary maps,
diﬀerentials and linear sums of IAES
cipher
Substitution orbits Orb(x, hT,T i) equal
to
Orb = {{0, 1}, {2, 3, 246, 247, 140, 141}, {4, 5,
82, 83, 202, 203}, {6, 7, 209, 208, 122, 123}, {8,
9, 79, 78, 233, 232}, {10, 11, 192, 193, 40, 41},
{12, 13, 225, 224, 177, 176}, {14, 15, 199, 198,
228, 229}, {16, 17, 180, 181, 117, 116}, {18, 19,
75, 74, 171, 170}, {20, 21, 43, 42, 152, 153}, {22,
23, 95, 94, 97, 96}, {24, 25, 63, 62, 89, 88}, {26,
27, 204, 205, 252, 253}, {28, 29, 64, 65, 254, 255},
{30, 31, 178, 179, 239, 238}, {32, 33, 110, 111, 59,
58}, {34, 35, 241, 240, 91, 90}, {36, 37, 77, 76, 84,
85}, {38, 39, 201, 200, 169, 168}, {44, 45, 68, 69,
49, 48}, {46, 47, 194, 195, 163, 162}, {50, 51, 108,
109, 147, 146}, {52, 53, 57, 56, 242, 243}, {54,
55, 66, 67, 103, 102}, {60, 61, 187, 186, 118, 119},
{70, 71, 105, 104, 244, 245}, {72, 73, 100, 101,
166, 167}, {80, 81, 92, 93, 236, 237}, {86, 87, 191,
190, 134, 135}, {98, 99, 211, 210, 174, 175}, {106,
107, 223, 222, 144, 145}, {112, 113, 183, 182, 120,
121}, {114, 115, 133, 132, 150, 151}, {124, 125,
250, 251, 160, 161}, {126, 127, 130, 131, 128, 129},
{136, 137, 158, 159, 154, 155}, {138, 139, 217, 216,
148, 149}, {142, 143, 164, 165, 184, 185}, {156,
157, 220, 221, 248, 249}, {172, 173, 231, 230, 207,
206}, {188, 189}, {196, 197, 212, 213, 219, 218},
{214, 215, 234, 235, 227, 226}}.
Substitutions M, Mt, Mt1 equal
respectively to
M = {99, 124, 93, 66, 31, 0, 33, 62, 155, 132, 165,
186, 231, 248, 217, 198, 146, 141, 172, 179, 238,
241, 208, 207, 106, 117, 84, 75, 22, 9, 40, 55, 128,
159, 190, 161, 252, 227, 194, 221, 120, 103, 70, 89,
4, 27, 58, 37, 113, 110, 79, 80, 13, 18, 51, 44, 137,
150, 183, 168, 245, 234, 203, 212, 164, 187, 154,
133, 216, 199, 230, 249, 92, 67, 98, 125, 32, 63, 30,
1, 85, 74, 107, 116, 41, 54, 23, 8, 173, 178, 147,
140, 209, 206, 239, 240, 71, 88, 121, 102, 59, 36,
5, 26, 191, 160, 129, 158, 195, 220, 253, 226, 182,
169, 136, 151, 202, 213, 244, 235, 78, 81, 112, 111,
50, 45, 12, 19, 236, 243, 210, 205, 144, 143, 174,
177, 20, 11, 42, 53, 104, 119, 86, 73, 29, 2, 35, 60,
97, 126, 95, 64, 229, 250, 219, 196, 153, 134, 167,
184, 15, 16, 49, 46, 115, 108, 77, 82, 247, 232, 201,
214, 139, 148, 181, 170, 254, 225, 192, 223, 130,
157, 188, 163, 6, 25, 56, 39, 122, 101, 68, 91, 43,
52, 21, 10, 87, 72, 105, 118, 211, 204, 237, 242,
175, 176, 145, 142, 218, 197, 228, 251, 166, 185,
152, 135, 34, 61, 28, 3, 94, 65, 96, 127, 200, 215,
246, 233, 180, 171, 138, 149, 48, 47, 14, 17, 76, 83,
114, 109, 57, 38, 7, 24, 69, 90, 123, 100, 193, 222,
255, 224, 189, 162, 131, 156};
Mt = {177, 62, 46, 161, 143, 0, 16, 159, 205, 66,
82, 221, 243, 124, 108, 227, 73, 198, 214, 89, 119,
248, 232, 103, 53, 186, 170, 37, 11, 132, 148, 27,
64, 207, 223, 80, 126, 241, 225, 110, 60, 179, 163,
44, 2, 141, 157, 18, 184, 55, 39, 168, 134, 9, 25,
150, 196, 75, 91, 212, 250, 117, 101, 234, 210, 93,
77, 194, 236, 99, 115, 252, 174, 33, 49, 190, 144,
31, 15, 128, 42, 165, 181, 58, 20, 155, 139, 4, 86,
217, 201, 70, 104, 231, 247, 120, 35, 172, 188, 51,
29, 146, 130, 13, 95, 208, 192, 79, 97, 238, 254,
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113, 219, 84, 68, 203, 229, 106, 122, 245, 167, 40,
56, 183, 153, 22, 6, 137, 246, 121, 105, 230, 200,
71, 87, 216, 138, 5, 21, 154, 180, 59, 43, 164, 14,
129, 145, 30, 48, 191, 175, 32, 114, 253, 237, 98,
76, 195, 211, 92, 7, 136, 152, 23, 57, 182, 166, 41,
123, 244, 228, 107, 69, 202, 218, 85, 255, 112, 96,
239, 193, 78, 94, 209, 131, 12, 28, 147, 189, 50, 34,
173, 149, 26, 10, 133, 171, 36, 52, 187, 233, 102,
118, 249, 215, 88, 72, 199, 109, 226, 242, 125, 83,
220, 204, 67, 17, 158, 142, 1, 47, 160, 176, 63, 100,
235, 251, 116, 90, 213, 197, 74, 24, 151, 135, 8, 38,
169, 185, 54, 156, 19, 3, 140, 162, 45, 61, 178, 224,
111, 127, 240, 222, 81, 65, 206};
Mt1 = {210, 66, 115, 227, 144, 0, 49, 161, 86, 198,
247, 103, 20, 132, 181, 37, 219, 75, 122, 234, 153,
9, 56, 168, 95, 207, 254, 110, 29, 141, 188, 44, 192,
80, 97, 241, 130, 18, 35, 179, 68, 212, 229, 117, 6,
150, 167, 55, 201, 89, 104, 248, 139, 27, 42, 186,
77, 221, 236, 124, 15, 159, 174, 62, 118, 230, 215,
71, 52, 164, 149, 5, 242, 98, 83, 195, 176, 32, 17,
129, 127, 239, 222, 78, 61, 173, 156, 12, 251, 107,
90, 202, 185, 41, 24, 136, 100, 244, 197, 85,
38, 182, 135, 23, 224, 112, 65, 209, 162, 50, 3, 147,
109, 253, 204, 92, 47, 191, 142, 30, 233, 121, 72,
216, 171, 59, 10, 154, 26, 138, 187, 43, 88, 200,
249, 105, 158, 14, 63, 175, 220, 76, 125, 237, 19,
131, 178, 34, 81, 193, 240, 96, 151, 7, 54, 166, 213,
69, 116, 228, 8, 152, 169, 57, 74, 218, 235, 123,
140, 28, 45, 189, 206, 94, 111, 255, 1, 145, 160, 48,
67, 211, 226, 114, 133, 21, 36, 180, 199, 87, 102,
246, 190, 46, 31, 143, 252, 108, 93, 205, 58, 170,
155, 11, 120, 232, 217, 73, 183, 39, 22, 134, 245,
101, 84, 196, 51, 163, 146, 2, 113, 225, 208, 64,
172, 60, 13, 157, 238, 126, 79, 223, 40, 184, 137,
25, 106, 250, 203, 91, 165, 53, 4, 148, 231, 119, 70,
214, 33, 177, 128, 16, 99, 243, 194, 82}.
Auxiliary substitutions equal to
 = {0, 1, 246, 3, 82, 5, 209, 7, 79, 9, 192, 11, 225,
13, 199, 15, 180, 17, 75, 19, 43, 21, 95, 23, 63,
25, 204, 27, 64, 29, 178, 31, 110, 33, 241, 35, 77,
37, 201, 39, 10, 41, 42, 152, 68, 45, 194, 47, 48,
44, 108, 51, 57, 53, 66, 55, 56, 242, 58, 32, 187,
61, 62, 89, 254, 65, 103, 67, 49, 69, 105, 71, 100,
73, 74, 171, 76, 84, 78, 233, 92, 81, 202, 83, 36,
85, 191, 87, 88, 24, 90, 34, 236, 93, 94, 97, 96, 22,
211, 99, 166, 101, 102, 54, 104, 244, 223, 107, 147,
109, 59, 111, 183, 113, 133, 115, 116, 16, 60, 119,
112, 121, 6, 123, 250, 125, 130, 127, 126, 129, 128,
131, 132, 150, 86, 135, 158, 137, 217, 139, 2, 141,
164, 143, 106, 145, 146, 50, 138, 149, 114, 151, 20,
153, 136, 155, 220, 157, 154, 159, 124, 161, 162,
46, 184, 165, 72, 167, 168, 38, 170, 18, 231, 173,
98, 175, 176, 12, 239, 179, 117, 181, 182, 120, 142,
185, 186, 118, 188, 189, 190, 134, 40, 193, 163,
195, 212, 197, 198, 228, 200, 169, 4, 203, 252, 205,
206, 172, 208, 122, 210, 174, 219, 213, 234, 215,
216, 148, 218, 196, 248, 221, 222, 144, 224, 177,
226, 214, 14, 229, 230, 207, 232, 8, 227, 235, 80,
237, 238, 30, 240, 91, 52, 243, 70, 245, 140, 247,
156, 249, 160, 251, 26, 253, 28, 255};
 = {99, 124, 123, 66, 107, 0, 197, 62, 1, 132, 43,
186, 215, 248, 118, 198, 130, 141, 125, 179, 89,
241, 240, 207, 212, 117, 175, 75, 164, 9, 192, 55,
253, 159, 38, 161, 63, 227, 204, 221, 165, 103, 70,
229, 216, 27, 21, 37, 113, 4, 195, 80, 150, 18, 154,
44, 137, 7, 183, 128, 39, 234, 203, 178, 131, 187,
26, 133, 110, 199, 160, 249, 59, 67, 98, 214, 32,
41, 30, 47, 209, 74, 237, 116, 252, 54, 91, 8, 173,
106, 147, 190, 76, 206, 239, 88, 71, 208, 251, 102,
77, 36, 5, 51, 191, 69, 127, 158, 60, 220, 168, 226,
163, 169, 143, 151, 202, 146, 245, 235, 182, 81, 33,
111, 255, 45, 210, 19, 12, 243, 236, 205, 144, 95,
23, 177, 167, 11, 61, 53, 93, 119, 115, 73, 129, 2,
35, 79, 42, 126, 136, 64, 238, 250, 20, 196, 94, 134,
219, 184, 50, 16, 49, 58, 6, 108, 92, 82, 247, 194,
201, 172, 149, 148, 121, 170, 254, 231, 109, 223,
213, 157, 188, 78, 86, 25, 56, 244, 122, 101, 68,
174, 120, 52, 46, 10, 166, 72, 105, 180, 211, 232,
31, 242, 189, 176, 145, 139, 218, 112, 228, 181, 3,
185, 14, 135, 34, 97, 28, 87, 193, 65, 96, 29, 200,
225, 246, 152, 217, 171, 138, 142, 48, 155, 233, 17,
85, 83, 114, 40, 57, 140, 13, 24, 230, 90, 104, 100,
153, 222, 15, 224, 84, 162, 22, 156};
1 = {177, 62, 61, 161, 181, 0, 226, 159, 128, 66,
149, 221, 235, 124, 187, 227, 193, 198, 190, 89, 44,
248, 120, 103, 234, 186, 215, 37, 210, 132, 96, 27,
254, 207, 19, 80, 31, 241, 102, 110, 82, 179, 163,
114, 236, 141, 10, 18, 184, 2, 97, 168, 75, 9, 77,
150, 196, 3, 91, 64, 147, 117, 101, 217, 65, 93, 13,
194, 55, 99, 208, 252, 29, 33, 49, 107, 144, 20, 15,
151, 104, 165, 118, 58, 126, 155, 173, 4, 86, 53,
201, 223, 38, 231, 247, 172, 35, 232, 125, 51, 166,
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146, 130, 25, 95, 162, 63, 79, 30, 238, 212, 113,
209, 84, 71, 203, 229, 73, 250, 245, 219, 40, 16,
183, 127, 22, 105, 137, 6, 121, 246, 230, 200, 175,
139, 216, 211, 5, 158, 154, 46, 59, 57, 164, 192,
129, 145, 39, 21, 191, 68, 32, 119, 253, 138, 98, 47,
195, 237, 92, 153, 136, 152, 157, 131, 182, 174, 41,
123, 225, 228, 214, 74, 202, 188, 85, 255, 243, 54,
239, 106, 78, 94, 167, 43, 12, 28, 122, 189, 50, 34,
87, 60, 26, 23, 133, 83, 36, 52, 90, 233, 244, 143,
249, 222, 88, 72, 69, 109, 56, 242, 218, 1, 220, 135,
67, 17, 48, 142, 171, 224, 160, 176, 14, 100, 112,
251, 204, 108, 213, 197, 199, 24, 205, 116, 8, 42,
169, 185, 148, 156, 70, 134, 140, 115, 45, 180, 178,
76, 111, 7, 240, 170, 81, 11, 206};
2 = {210, 66, 70, 227, 222, 0, 39, 161, 129, 198,
190, 103, 60, 132, 205, 37, 67, 75, 195, 234, 117, 9,
136, 168, 62, 207, 120, 110, 118, 141, 160, 44, 3,
80, 53, 241, 32, 18, 170, 179, 247, 212, 229, 151,
52, 150, 31, 55, 201, 6, 162, 248, 221, 27, 215, 186,
77, 4, 236, 192, 180, 159, 174, 107, 194, 230, 23,
71, 89, 164, 112, 5, 38, 98, 83, 189, 176, 61, 17,
184, 185, 239, 155, 78, 130, 173, 246, 12, 251, 95,
90, 97, 106, 41, 24, 244, 100, 56, 134, 85, 235, 182,
135, 42, 224, 231, 64, 209, 34, 50, 124, 147, 114,
253, 200, 92, 47, 219, 15, 30, 109, 121, 49, 216,
128, 59, 187, 154, 10, 138, 26, 43, 88, 240, 156,
105, 116, 14, 163, 175, 115, 76, 74, 237, 65, 131,
178, 104, 63, 193, 204, 96, 153, 7, 158, 166, 113,
69, 54, 228, 171, 152, 169, 167, 133, 218, 242, 123,
140, 35, 45, 122, 223, 94, 197, 255, 1, 20, 91, 48,
191, 211, 226, 233, 125, 21, 36, 142, 199, 87, 102,
249, 68, 46, 57, 143, 245, 108, 93, 238, 58, 28, 144,
11, 99, 232, 217, 206, 183, 72, 22, 111, 2, 101, 137,
196, 51, 81, 146, 252, 33, 225, 208, 19, 172, 145,
13, 84, 181, 126, 79, 73, 40, 86, 157, 25, 127, 250,
203, 188, 165, 202, 139, 148, 149, 119, 220, 214,
213, 177, 8, 16, 254, 243, 29, 82}.
Diﬀerentials and linear sums of the
IXOR map in IAES cipher are deﬁned by a
boundless table. To study the properties of
this table let us examine the sections of this
map by each byte, i.e. byte substitution of
type ' 1('(x ) + y), ' 1( (x ) + y), ' 1(1(x )
+ y), ' 1(2(x ) + y). Each y deﬁnes its
substitution as input function x. For each y =
0, 1, . . . , 255 probabilities of the most probable
diﬀerentials of the aforementioned 5 substitutions
equal respectively (the table element has to be
divided by 256):
{256, 6, 82, 50, 76, 56, 90, 42, 88, 44, 78, 54, 70,
70, 80, 56, 84, 52, 84, 48, 90, 42, 86, 46, 72, 64,
64, 68, 76, 60, 70, 66, 68, 64, 68, 72, 64, 72, 72,
60, 80, 56, 78, 58, 76, 56, 82, 50, 82, 54, 72, 60,
64, 68, 76, 60, 92, 44, 82, 50, 68, 64, 86, 50, 68,
64, 72, 60, 64, 68, 60, 72, 64, 68, 86, 50, 80, 52,
66, 70, 72, 64, 70, 62, 70, 62, 76, 56, 86, 46, 76,
56, 78, 62, 88, 48, 86, 46, 82, 54, 90, 42, 84, 48,
70, 66, 72, 60, 74, 58, 74, 58, 92, 44, 86, 46, 92,
44, 72, 60, 76, 56, 74, 58, 72, 68, 64, 68, 96, 36,
82, 50, 88, 44, 86, 46, 88, 44, 76, 56, 70, 66, 80,
52, 84, 48, 82, 50, 80, 52, 82, 50, 72, 60, 72, 60,
76, 56, 64, 68, 64, 72, 66, 66, 64, 68, 68, 64, 78,
54, 74, 62, 76, 60, 84, 48, 74, 66, 68, 68, 64, 72,
70, 62, 80, 52, 82, 50, 82, 56, 82, 54, 60, 72, 68,
64, 64, 68, 58, 78, 76, 60, 84, 56, 68, 68, 70, 62,
78, 58, 66, 66, 58, 74, 84, 56, 82, 50, 76, 56, 78,
54, 86, 46, 82, 50, 88, 48, 86, 46, 84, 52, 82, 58,
72, 64, 72, 60, 74, 58, 88, 48, 78, 54, 76, 56, 74,
58, 72, 60, 76, 60, 68, 64, 64, 72};
{30, 32, 32, 38, 32, 38, 34, 34, 30, 38, 36, 32, 28,
36, 28, 32, 32, 40, 32, 34, 34, 32, 26, 40, 36, 32,
30, 36, 34, 32, 30, 40, 34, 38, 36, 32, 32, 38, 40,
32, 28, 38, 32, 34, 36, 38, 34, 34, 36, 36, 34, 32,
36, 32, 32, 42, 32, 34, 32, 34, 34, 38, 34, 36, 32,
36, 32, 36, 42, 34, 38, 38, 30, 38, 36, 36, 32, 40,
28, 38, 34, 40, 38, 34, 34, 36, 32, 32, 28, 42, 32,
32, 32, 36, 32, 34, 32, 34, 30, 40, 38, 36, 32, 42,
32, 38, 30, 30, 34, 32, 28, 42, 28, 36, 36, 38, 36,
36, 36, 34, 28, 38, 32, 38, 32, 38, 34, 32, 30, 36,
34, 32, 36, 34, 28, 36, 38, 34, 34, 34, 34, 40, 36,
34, 32, 34, 38, 34, 34, 30, 30, 36, 32, 38, 38, 28,
40, 32, 38, 42, 34, 38, 36, 38, 34, 34, 32, 36, 32,
36, 36, 32, 36, 36, 38, 38, 36, 36, 34, 34, 38, 32,
38, 42, 34, 36, 38, 30, 34, 32, 32, 34, 32, 36, 30,
34, 38, 30, 36, 40, 32, 38, 34, 38, 30, 36, 34, 34,
34, 32, 32, 36, 34, 38, 36, 34, 34, 32, 34, 32, 36,
38, 34, 34, 36, 34, 30, 36, 32, 30, 30, 36, 36, 36,
30, 40, 36, 32, 36, 36, 34, 32, 34, 34, 34, 36, 32,
38, 34, 38, 38, 36, 34, 34, 34, 34};
{34, 34, 38, 34, 34, 36, 38, 34, 40, 34, 32, 36, 30,
34, 32, 40, 34, 34, 28, 34, 34, 36, 36, 38, 32, 40,
36, 36, 36, 40, 32, 34, 36, 36, 38, 32, 34, 34, 42,
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32, 40, 32, 30, 42, 34, 30, 34, 38, 36, 34, 32, 32,
36, 36, 34, 34, 36, 40, 32, 38, 32, 38, 32, 30, 32,
38, 36, 34, 38, 38, 32, 34, 36, 40, 32, 34, 38, 32,
32, 34, 36, 34, 34, 34, 38, 30, 34, 34, 30, 34, 36,
32, 34, 34, 36, 36, 34, 32, 36, 30, 38, 36, 36, 34,
38, 32, 34, 30, 36, 32, 34, 38, 38, 34, 44, 36, 36,
26, 38, 34, 34, 32, 38, 30, 38, 32, 36, 34, 32, 34,
38, 34, 32, 36, 36, 38, 36, 32, 30, 36, 32, 32, 32,
40, 34, 34, 30, 36, 36, 36, 32, 34, 36, 42, 34, 36,
34, 42, 34, 34, 30, 34, 38, 34, 34, 34, 42, 30, 36,
34, 30, 40, 38, 30, 34, 36, 36, 34, 32, 34, 34, 36,
32, 34, 38, 38, 36, 36, 36, 38, 32, 32, 34, 38, 36,
32, 38, 38, 34, 30, 36, 38, 34, 36, 38, 32, 36, 34,
32, 34, 34, 34, 42, 28, 34, 32, 34, 34, 38, 32, 36,
34, 36, 36, 34, 34, 36, 32, 40, 36, 38, 30, 38, 34,
32, 32, 36, 32, 32, 34, 40, 36, 44, 32, 38, 32, 36,
32, 34, 30, 38, 30, 36, 32, 36, 34};
{30, 28, 30, 34, 40, 28, 36, 32, 38, 34, 46, 28, 32,
34, 32, 40, 30, 46, 34, 36, 36, 38, 38, 36, 34, 36,
30, 44, 32, 36, 30, 40, 30, 40, 32, 34, 36, 38, 34,
36, 38, 30, 36, 30, 34, 38, 34, 38, 32, 36, 34, 36,
36, 28, 34, 30, 38, 32, 36, 34, 32, 36, 32, 32, 32,
34, 32, 38, 36, 36, 34, 34, 36, 38, 30, 32, 32, 36,
30, 36, 34, 36, 36, 34, 40, 32, 34, 36, 40, 34, 44,
34, 38, 36, 40, 36, 32, 38, 34, 34, 36, 34, 36, 32,
42, 36, 34, 32, 32, 38, 30, 38, 28, 34, 34, 36, 34,
36, 34, 34, 34, 36, 36, 34, 28, 38, 30, 36, 36, 28,
38, 34, 40, 34, 30, 36, 30, 34, 38, 32, 40, 32, 36,
32, 36, 38, 36, 38, 26, 44, 32, 36, 30, 36, 32, 38,
34, 38, 34, 42, 36, 36, 34, 34, 32, 34, 28, 36, 36,
38, 34, 40, 38, 38, 36, 36, 40, 32, 34, 30, 34, 36,
32, 36, 38, 36, 34, 30, 36, 28, 36, 32, 30, 38, 36,
34, 32, 36, 30, 36, 32, 34, 30, 38, 34, 36, 34, 34,
36, 36, 34, 38, 30, 34, 34, 32, 36, 38, 40, 34, 42,
30, 44, 32, 36, 30, 34, 30, 32, 38, 32, 34, 34, 36,
32, 38, 32, 38, 36, 38, 40, 34, 36, 36, 34, 38, 30,
36, 32, 36, 30, 36, 36, 32, 36, 32}.
Maximum and minimum dominances
of linear sums of the aforementioned substitutions
for each y = 0, . . . , 255 equal respectively (table
values have to be divided by 256):
{128, 16, 68, 48, 60, 52, 68, 48, 60, 44, 60, 48, 52,
60, 68, 48, 64, 44, 64, 44, 64, 44, 68, 40, 56, 52,
56, 56, 56, 52, 56, 52, 56, 60, 52, 52, 56, 56, 60,
52, 56, 52, 56, 52, 68, 48, 60, 44, 60, 48, 56, 52,
56, 56, 52, 52, 64, 40, 68, 48, 60, 56, 68, 44, 60,
56, 56, 44, 52, 56, 52, 56, 56, 64, 64, 40, 64, 48,
60, 60, 56, 48, 56, 56, 56, 52, 56, 56, 68, 40, 60,
48, 60, 52, 60, 52, 64, 44, 60, 48, 68, 40, 72, 44,
60, 52, 64, 52, 60, 44, 60, 48, 64, 40, 64, 48, 64,
40, 60, 52, 60, 52, 60, 52, 52, 48, 56, 56, 68, 40,
60, 52, 60, 44, 60, 44, 68, 44, 56, 52, 52, 52, 64,
44, 60, 44, 60, 48, 60, 52, 60, 44, 60, 52, 56, 48,
60, 48, 60, 56, 48, 60, 52, 56, 52, 52, 56, 52, 64,
52, 56, 48, 60, 52, 68, 40, 56, 48, 52, 56, 68, 52,
56, 56, 60, 40, 64, 40, 60, 48, 64, 48, 52, 60, 52,
56, 56, 56, 48, 60, 56, 52, 64, 52, 52, 52, 56, 52,
56, 48, 60, 52, 52, 60, 68, 44, 64, 56, 60, 48, 64,
48, 60, 40, 68, 48, 60, 44, 64, 52, 68, 48, 60, 44,
56, 52, 56, 52, 64, 48, 68, 52, 60, 44, 60, 48, 60,
48, 56, 52, 64, 56, 60, 56, 56, 56};
{-128, -16, -60, -44, -56, -30, -64, -40, -60, -42, -60,
-52, -56, -52, -60, -44, -64, -44, -64, -40, -68, -40,
-60, -48, -56, -48, -52, -60, -64, -48, -56, -56, -64,
-56, -52, -56, -60, -56, -56, -60, -56, -44, -64, -52,
-60, -48, -68, -48, -56, -48, -60, -48, -56, -56, -60,
-52, -68, -40, -56, -56, -52, -48, -60, -44, -60, -52,
-56, -52, -52, -52, -52, -52, -56, -52, -64, -48, -64,
-48, -52, -56, -52, -52, -56, -52, -56, -48, -68, -52,
-64, -44, -60, -44, -60, -56, -72, -48, -60, -44, -64,
-52, -64, -48, -68, -40, -64, -52, -56, -56, -56, -52,
-60, -48, -68, -40, -64, -44, -68, -44, -56, -52, -60,
-48, -56, -52, -56, -56, -52, -56, -64, -36, -68, -52,
-68, -40, -60, -44, -68, -40, -60, -44, -52, -56, -60,
-52, -60, -44, -64, -48, -60, -52, -68, -48, -52, -52,
-60, -52, -56, -52, -56, -52, -56, -56, -52, -52, -52,
-60, -52, -52, -60, -48, -56, -48, -64, -60, -68, -44,
-64, -56, -56, -52, -60, -60, -56, -52, -60, -48, -60,
-48, -60, -52, -64, -48, -52, -60, -52, -52, -56, -56,
-52, -64, -60, -48, -68, -52, -48, -56, -60, -52, -56,
-60, -52, -56, -52, -56, -60, -52, -60, -48, -60, -44,
-56, -48, -72, -52, -64, -52, -64, -44, -64, -44, -60,
-48, -56, -52, -52, -52, -56, -52, -60, -48, -64, -40,
-60, -44, -56, -48, -64, -60, -56, -48, -56, -52, -52,
-56, -60, -56};
{54, 48, 46, 58, 50, 48, 50, 48, 46, 52, 54, 46, 48,
48, 52, 48, 54, 52, 48, 56, 52, 44, 48, 50, 52, 48,
48, 48, 48, 46, 46, 50, 48, 52, 46, 52, 46, 52, 50,
48, 48, 52, 48, 48, 48, 50, 44, 50, 52, 48, 46, 48,
54, 50, 46, 50, 50, 44, 48, 52, 46, 46, 50, 52, 46,
52, 46, 52, 54, 48, 48, 52, 44, 54, 56, 50, 50, 42,
44, 52, 42, 46, 48, 48, 50, 52, 50, 52, 46, 50, 46,
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48, 44, 52, 46, 52, 46, 48, 48, 56, 46, 52, 52, 50,
44, 50, 52, 48, 48, 48, 44, 48, 46, 52, 50, 46, 48,
48, 52, 50, 46, 52, 46, 48, 46, 54, 48, 52, 48, 50,
54, 44, 46, 50, 50, 54, 50, 50, 52, 44, 50, 54, 48,
46, 48, 50, 52, 52, 48, 46, 50, 50, 48, 48, 54, 44,
52, 48, 50, 46, 54, 50, 48, 44, 54, 44, 46, 54, 48,
46, 46, 48, 52, 50, 50, 56, 46, 50, 44, 46, 48, 48,
48, 50, 48, 48, 50, 46, 52, 50, 48, 46, 44, 48, 58,
48, 50, 46, 50, 46, 44, 50, 50, 58, 52, 50, 52, 46,
50, 48, 48, 50, 44, 50, 52, 50, 46, 46, 52, 52, 50,
48, 46, 48, 50, 50, 46, 54, 48, 44, 52, 50, 46, 50,
44, 56, 54, 50, 48, 50, 46, 48, 50, 48, 48, 48, 48,
52, 52, 52, 50, 50, 44, 46, 50, 46};
{-46, -48, -48, -52, -46, -56, -56, -54, -48, -50, -50,
-46, -46, -46, -50, -48, -50, -54, -48, -50, -52, -44,
-46, -50, -46, -44, -46, -50, -46, -50, -46, -50, -48,
-52, -52, -48, -48, -48, -46, -46, -46, -50, -52, -48,
-50, -46, -50, -46, -48, -46, -46, -56, -50, -50, -54,
-46, -52, -50, -48, -52, -46, -50, -54, -50, -44, -52,
-52, -50, -50, -46, -46, -46, -48, -50, -54, -48, -50,
-48, -42, -56, -46, -54, -56, -50, -44, -50, -46, -48,
-54, -54, -50, -54, -46, -50, -48, -50, -48, -52, -44,
-32, -48, -50, -44, -48, -46, -54, -48, -52, -50, -46,
-44, -50, -46, -52, -48, -48, -50, -52, -48, -50, -48,
-50, -50, -48, -44, -50, -50, -50, -48, -46, -50, -46,
-46, -46, -46, -50, -54, -52, -48, -48, -46, -50, -50,
-46, -46, -50, -48, -48, -48, -46, -48, -50, -48, -54,
-52, -48, -52, -48, -52, -50, -52, -44, -50, -46, -50,
-48, -48, -50, -48, -50, -50, -48, -50, -48, -48, -50,
-50, -48, -48, -50, -48, -48, -50, -54, -46, -58, -50,
-44, -48, -48, -48, -52, -50, -52, -50, -54, -50, -52,
-46, -50, -48, -48, -50, -48, -46, -50, -50, -46, -54,
-48, -46, -48, -46, -46, -44, -48, -48, -50, -50, -48,
-48, -54, -46, -50, -52, -48, -46, -48, -46, -44, -50,
-52, -50, -48, -46, -54, -50, -50, -52, -46, -54, -52,
-46, -48, -46, -56, -48, -54, -50, -50, -46, -50, -46,
-50, -46, -48};
{54, 54, 50, 52, 44, 48, 46, 56, 52, 46, 44, 50, 44,
56, 46, 48, 50, 50, 42, 50, 44, 54, 48, 48, 46, 50,
48, 48, 46, 48, 50, 52, 52, 46, 50, 46, 46, 58, 50,
44, 52, 48, 50, 50, 48, 48, 44, 50, 48, 52, 48, 46,
46, 54, 46, 46, 48, 46, 50, 50, 46, 54, 48, 48, 52,
50, 48, 46, 50, 52, 46, 48, 48, 44, 48, 50, 48, 46,
52, 50, 48, 46, 44, 46, 52, 50, 46, 50, 46, 50, 50,
44, 50, 54, 48, 50, 50, 58, 46, 44, 48, 50, 46, 48,
48, 46, 46, 48, 48, 46, 46, 52, 48, 52, 50, 50, 52,
44, 54, 48, 52, 52, 52, 44, 50, 50, 48, 50, 46, 50,
52, 50, 48, 56, 48, 48, 48, 50, 44, 48, 56, 50, 48,
50, 50, 46, 50, 52, 42, 48, 46, 54, 48, 52, 44, 46,
46, 52, 48, 50, 46, 50, 48, 46, 48, 50, 50, 44, 54,
48, 46, 46, 54, 42, 52, 48, 50, 50, 46, 50, 46, 52,
48, 44, 52, 48, 58, 46, 48, 46, 46, 44, 50, 50, 52,
50, 50, 50, 52, 50, 46, 52, 50, 48, 50, 44, 46, 52,
46, 48, 52, 48, 48, 46, 50, 48, 48, 48, 50, 46, 52,
48, 48, 48, 48, 46, 50, 50, 54, 50, 48, 50, 52, 44,
44, 46, 52, 46, 50, 50, 50, 48, 52, 48, 48, 50, 52,
48, 52, 50, 52, 48, 54, 46, 54, 50};
{-46, -46, -46, -52, -46, -54, -46, -52, -48, -52, -48,
-46, -46, -52, -48, -46, -48, -50, -46, -50, -52, -54,
-46, -48, -46, -52, -48, -52, -48, -50, -48, -54, -50,
-50, -52, -42, -44, -50, -48, -48, -48, -46, -42, -46,
-48, -52, -46, -50, -52, -50, -50, -52, -48, -48, -46,
-54, -46, -52, -46, -52, -48, -50, -52, -46, -48, -52,
-48, -44, -50, -54, -48, -46, -48, -48, -46, -50, -52,
-48, -48, -50, -48, -46, -46, -48, -48, -50, -50, -48,
-50, -46, -50, -48, -48, -50, -50, -48, -50, -46, -52,
-48, -46, -50, -48, -48, -48, -44, -52, -52, -48, -46,
-42, -52, -50, -52, -56, -48, -52, -46, -54, -46, -50,
-48, -50, -50, -48, -50, -54, -48, -48, -46, -46, -46,
-48, -48, -46, -48, -50, -50, -46, -46, -52, -48, -48,
-50, -50, -54, -50, -48, -52, -48, -46, -50, -48, -52,
-50, -52, -50, -54, -50, -46, -48, -48, -44, -46, -46,
-46, -56, -46, -56, -44, -48, -52, -52, -50, -44, -48,
-48, -32, -46, -48, -52, -52, -48, -48, -50, -48, -50,
-46, -50, -50, -52, -48, -48, -48, -50, -48, -46, -48,
-52, -44, -48, -56, -46, -48, -54, -48, -44, -54, -46,
-48, -48, -56, -46, -46, -48, -50, -48, -56, -52, -44,
-50, -50, -52, -52, -46, -46, -52, -46, -50, -50, -52,
-46, -48, -44, -48, -52, -56, -48, -48, -50, -52, -44,
-48, -48, -50, -54, -50, -46, -50, -46, -48, -42, -52,
-46, -46, -52};
{48, 46, 48, 46, 50, 44, 52, 52, 48, 46, 54, 46, 48,
50, 52, 50, 46, 48, 46, 48, 52, 52, 52, 44, 54, 48,
46, 56, 46, 56, 44, 56, 42, 50, 44, 52, 46, 50, 48,
46, 52, 46, 48, 48, 48, 48, 48, 50, 46, 48, 44, 46,
58, 50, 50, 50, 46, 44, 52, 44, 50, 48, 48, 44, 48,
50, 46, 50, 48, 48, 48, 46, 48, 44, 48, 52, 48, 48,
54, 56, 50, 50, 50, 46, 50, 46, 52, 48, 48, 48, 46,
44, 50, 44, 50, 46, 42, 50, 50, 54, 50, 50, 50, 46,
54, 52, 48, 46, 48, 52, 50, 48, 48, 48, 48, 46, 50,
46, 52, 46, 48, 48, 54, 44, 44, 48, 48, 48, 52, 48,
50, 48, 50, 46, 42, 54, 50, 50, 50, 46, 52, 48, 52,
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50, 50, 50, 50, 52, 44, 50, 52, 50, 56, 52, 44, 52,
48, 46, 48, 48, 46, 48, 48, 46, 48, 52, 52, 44, 46,
50, 50, 50, 50, 54, 48, 50, 50, 44, 48, 46, 48, 48,
46, 52, 46, 50, 48, 52, 48, 44, 50, 46, 44, 54, 50,
48, 54, 50, 48, 44, 48, 54, 46, 56, 44, 52, 48, 52,
50, 44, 50, 46, 52, 52, 52, 48, 52, 48, 50, 54, 50,
46, 58, 50, 50, 46, 48, 48, 54, 52, 48, 48, 50, 48,
50, 50, 46, 50, 50, 50, 52, 48, 48, 48, 48, 48, 46,
52, 46, 46, 46, 48, 54, 48, 50, 46};
{-50, -46, -48, -48, -54, -46, -48, -48, -48, -42, -56,
-42, -54, -50, -48, -48, -48, -50, -50, -50, -46, -46,
-52, -48, -46, -48, -48, -62, -48, -52, -44, -48, -44,
-56, -50, -54, -50, -48, -48, -48, -50, -46, -50, -50,
-48, -48, -48, -52, -44, -50, -52, -48, -52, -46, -50,
-50, -50, -50, -50, -46, -48, -52, -46, -48, -48, -50,
-46, -52, -48, -44, -50, -50, -52, -52, -48, -50, -48,
-52, -48, -50, -54, -54, -50, -46, -52, -50, -46, -50,
-48, -46, -58, -52, -52, -48, -52, -44, -44, -50, -54,
-48, -50, -54, -52, -50, -52, -52, -52, -46, -44, -52,
-46, -48, -50, -50, -50, -54, -54, -48, -54, -48, -50,
-50, -48, -44, -52, -50, -46, -50, -52, -46, -50, -48,
-46, -48, -44, -50, -46, -50, -50, -46, -50, -42, -52,
-48, -52, -52, -46, -52, -44, -50, -46, -54, -52, -50,
-46, -48, -50, -48, -48, -48, -48, -48, -50, -50, -50,
-50, -48, -52, -48, -50, -50, -50, -48, -52, -46, -50,
-50, -46, -54, -48, -48, -50, -46, -50, -44, -46, -46,
-46, -46, -48, -48, -52, -58, -54, -44, -48, -46, -50,
-46, -52, -48, -48, -46, -54, -48, -50, -50, -44, -50,
-48, -32, -48, -46, -50, -50, -48, -48, -46, -50, -48,
-50, -54, -50, -52, -52, -48, -48, -48, -50, -52, -46,
-46, -48, -50, -46, -50, -50, -46, -48, -50, -48, -42,
-46, -52, -44, -52, -50, -50, -46, -50, -44, -54, -54,
-48, -46, -44}.
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